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Van Fraassen infers the truth of the contextual theory from his observation that it has passed a 
crucial test. Mizrahi infers the comparative truth of our best theories from his observation that 
they are more successful than their competitors. Their inferences require, according to the 
argument from double spaces, the prior belief that it is more likely that their target theories 
were pulled out from the T-space than from the O-space. The T-space is the logical space of 
unconceived theories whose appearances agree with their realities; the O-space is the logical 
space of unconceived theories whose appearances may agree or disagree with their realities. 
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1. Introduction 
My (2020) argument from double spaces mirrors Bas van Fraassen’s (1989) argument from a 
bad lot in multiple respects. If the argument from a bad lot spells trouble for scientific realism, 
then the argument from double spaces also spells trouble for van Fraassen’s (1980) contextual 
theory, Moti Mizrahi’s (2020) relative realism, and a host of other philosophical positions 
including scientific realism. This article aims to elaborate and sharpen the argument from 
double spaces in light of Mizrahi’s (2021) response to it. 
 
2. Various Ways of Grouping Scientific Theories 
We can divide scientific theories into two groups in various ways, depending on what our 
interests are. In this section, I introduce the following three ways: 
We can divide scientific theories into a group of successful theories and a group of 
unsuccessful ones. Successful theories are those that have passed tests. For example, the 
Ptolemaic and Copernican theories were successful, given that they made true predictions 
about the motions of celestial bodies. Unsuccessful theories are those that have failed tests. The 
theory of cold fusion was unsuccessful, given that it did not make any true predictions. It was 
not only unsuccessful but also false, and it was never accepted by the scientific community. 
We can divide scientific theories into a group of true theories and a group of false ones. 
True theories are those that correspond to the world, while false theories are those that do not. 
Obsolete theories, such as the effluvial theory and the vibratory theory, were false. How about 
current theories? It is under dispute between scientific realists and antirealists whether they are 
true. Scientific realists classify them as true, while scientific antirealists do not. Some scientific 
antirealists, those who endorse the pessimistic induction, classify them as false.  
We can divide scientific theories into a group of theories that were selected from good 
lots and a group of theories that were selected from bad lots. In this context, a good lot is 
defined as a set of competing theories which includes the true one, and a bad lot is defined as 
a set of competing theories which does not include the true one. The best of a good lot is true, 
while the best of a bad lot is false. Scientific realists believe that our best theories were selected 
from good lots, scientific antirealists are skeptical that they were selected from good lots, and 
scientific pessimists believe that they were selected from bad lots. 
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Van Fraassen’s argument from a bad lot comes down to the request that scientific realists 
show that our best theories are more likely to have been selected from good lots than from bad 
lots. He says, “For me to take it that the best of set X will be more likely to be true than not, 
requires a prior belief that the truth is already more likely to be found in X, than not” (van 
Fraassen 1989, 143). This request is a demanding one, given that a true theory may exist not in 
the collection of imagined rivals but rather in the collection of unimagined rivals. To meet the 
demand, scientific realists would have to adduce evidence for the belief that our best theories 
are better than their unconceived rivals. 
 
3. Double Spaces 
In this section, I attempt to divide scientific theories into two groups in a way not mentioned 
in Section 2 above, making use of two technical concepts: the T-space and the O-space. I argue 
that scientific theories can be divided into a group of theories which were chosen from the T-
space and a group of theories which were chosen from the O-space. Let me first go through a 
few examples of scientific theories. 
The phlogiston theory and the continental drift theory have something interesting in 
common, although the former was false and the latter was true. We once believed that the 
phlogiston theory was true, but we now believe that it was false. We once believed that the 
continental drift theory was false, but we now believe that it was true. The similarity between 
them is that we once had false beliefs about them. Specifically, we once had the false belief 
about the phlogiston theory that it was true, and we once had the false belief about the 
continental drift theory that it was false.  
How about the oxygen theory? Ever since it was constructed, we believed that it was 
true, and we still believe that it is true. Suppose that it is true, and that our belief about it will 
not change. The oxygen theory and the continental drift theory, although both are true, can be 
classified as belonging to two different groups of scientific theories, because we have only had 
a true belief about the oxygen theory, but we once had a false belief about the continental drift 
theory. Compare now the oxygen theory with the theory of cold fusion. One is true, and the 
other is false. However, they can be classified as belonging to the same group of scientific 
theories, because we have never had false beliefs about them and have only true beliefs about 
them. This observation motivates the distinction between a group of theories about which we 
only have true beliefs and a group of theories about which we may have true or false beliefs. 
This distinction can be captured by two technical terms: “the T-space” and “the O-
space.” The T-space is the logical space of unconceived theories whose appearances agree with 
their realities.1  The reality of a theory pulled out from the T-space is transparent to us. 
Consequently, if it appears to be true, it is really true; if it appears to be false, it is really false. 
If it appears to be comparatively true, it is really comparatively true; if it appears to be 
comparatively false, it is really comparatively false. In sum, our belief about it is always true; 
it only gives rise to a true belief about itself in our minds. 
By contrast, the O-space is the logical space of unconceived theories whose appearances 
may agree or disagree with their realities. The reality of a theory selected from the O-space is 
opaque to us. Suppose, for example, that it is successful and thus it appears to be true. It does 
not follow that it is true; it may be true, or it may be false. Suppose that it is more successful 
than its competitors and thus it appears to be comparatively true. It does not follow that it is 
comparatively true; it may be comparatively true, or it may be comparatively false. Our belief 
about it is sometimes true and at other times false; in other words, it sometimes gives rise to a 
true belief about itself and at other times a false belief about itself in our minds. 
 
1 See Park (2020, 63) for a detailed discussion on the distinction between the appearance of a theory and its reality. 
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Let me apply these two concepts – the T-space and the O-space – to the examples of 
scientific theories above. The oxygen theory and the theory of cold fusion were chosen from 
the T-space. The oxygen theory appears to be true, and it is really true. The theory of cold 
fusion appeared to be false, and it is really false. The common feature of these two theories is 
that they only give rise to true beliefs about themselves. By contrast, the phlogiston theory and 
the continental drift theory were selected from the O-space. The phlogiston theory appeared to 
be true, but it was false. The continental drift theory appeared to be false, but it was true. The 
common feature of these two theories is that they once gave rise to false beliefs about 
themselves.  
The realities of some theories, whether they are true or false, are transparent to us. Their 
appearances coincide with their realities. They only give rise to true beliefs about themselves 
in our minds. They were all selected from the T-space. By contrast, the realities of other 
theories, whether they are true or false, are opaque to us. Their appearances may or may not 
coincide with their realities. They sometimes give rise to true beliefs and at other times false 
beliefs about themselves in our minds. They were all selected from the O-space. 
The T-space is not the space of true theories, and the O-space is not the space of false 
theories. Some inhabitants of the T-space are false, while other inhabitants are true. Similarly, 
some inhabitants of the O-space are true, while other inhabitants are false. Questions arise. 
Why is it that some inhabitants of the T-space are false? Why are some theories selected from 
the T-space false? In addition, why is it that some inhabitants of the O-space are true? Why are 
some theories selected from the O-space false? My answer to these questions is that the 
appearance of a theory may diverge from its reality.  
We can divide scientific theories into a group of theories pulled out from the T-space 
and a group of theories pulled out from the O-space. To do so is not to divide them into a group 
of true theories and a group of false ones. It is rather to divide them into a group of theories 
whose appearances agree with their realities and a group of theories whose appearances may 
agree or disagree with their realities. As a consequence, to ask whether a theory is pulled out 
from the T-space or O-space is not to ask whether it is true or false but rather to ask whether 
we can infer its reality from its appearance. If it is from the T-space, we can infer its reality 
from its appearance. By contrast, if it is from the O-space, it is not clear whether we can. 
The definitions of the T-space and the O-space just introduced are different from the old 
definitions of the T-space and the F-space in my (2020) previous article. I previously defined 
the T-space and the F-space as follows: 
 
The T-space is inhabited by the unconceived scientific theories that are commonly fated to lead 
us to true beliefs about themselves. (Park 2020, 63) 
 
By contrast, the F-space is inhabited by the unconceived scientific theories that are commonly 
fated to lead us to false beliefs about themselves. (Park 2020, 63) 
 
These old definitions fail to fully capture what I had in mind in the previous article. I hereby 
replace them with the new definitions. The new definitions fully capture what I had in mind in 
the previous article. Moreover, everything I said in my previous article regarding the argument 
from double spaces and its applications against several philosophical positions makes better 
sense with the new definitions than with the old definitions. 
Mizrahi (2021) defends relative realism against the argument from double spaces after 
interpretating the T-space and the F-space in my previous article as “the space of true theories” 
and “the space of false theories,” respectively (Mizrahi 2021, 4). This interpretation is due to 
my imprecise definitions of the T-space and the F-space quoted above. I should have stated 
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explicitly that some inhabitants of the T-space are false, and that some inhabitants of the F-
space are true. In addition, I should have provided a few examples to flesh out the concepts of 
the T-space and the F-space.  
 
4. The Argument from Double Spaces 
Philosophers infer the reality of a theory from its appearance, i.e., they observe a theory and 
then infer that it has a certain semantic property. These semantic properties include truth and 
comparative truth. Their inferences are challenged by the argument from double spaces 
according to which to take it that a theory has a certain semantic property requires the prior 
belief that it is more likely that it was pulled out from the T-space than from the O-space. Let 
me apply this argument to van Fraassen’s contextual theory and Mizrahi’s relative realism.  
Van Fraassen (1980, 130–131) infers the truth of the contextual theory from his 
observation that it has passed a crucial test (Park 2019, 91). Let us grant that the contextual 
theory has passed the crucial test,2 and that it appears to be true. But is it really true? In my 
view, to take it that the contextual theory is true on the grounds that it passed the crucial test 
requires the prior belief that it is more likely that the contextual theory was pulled out from the 
T-space than from the O-space. This view is similar to van Fraassen’s view that to take it that 
our best theories are true on the grounds that they passed crucial tests requires the prior belief 
that it is more likely that they were pulled out from good lots than from bad lots. 
Mizrahi (2020) infers the comparative truth of our best theories from his observation that 
they are more successful than their rivals. They may appear to be comparatively true, given 
that they are more successful than their rivals. But are they really comparatively true? In my 
view, to take it that they are comparatively true on the basis of the observation that they are 
more successful than their rivals requires the prior belief that it is more likely that they were 
pulled out from the T-space than from the O-space. This view is also similar to van Fraassen’s 
view above, which motivated Mizrahi to develop relative realism. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The T-space is not the space of true theories, and the O-space is not the space of false theories. 
The T-space is rather the space of unconceived theories whose appearances agree with their 
realities, and the O-space is rather the space of unconceived theories whose appearances may 
agree or disagree with their realities. Whenever philosophers infer that a theory, be it scientific 
or philosophical, has a semantic property on the grounds that it appears so, the argument from 
double spaces can come into play, requesting that they adduce evidence for the belief that it is 
more likely that it was pulled out from the T-space than from the O-space. This request is 
similar to van Fraassen’s request that scientific realists adduce evidence for the belief that it is 
more likely that a theory was pulled out from a good lot than from a bad lot. 
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